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The Rhetoric of <Military Readiness>:
Public Discourse, Whales and Navy Sonar
Terence Check
St. John‘s University
Abstract
On November 12, 2008, the Supreme Court decided a significant case involving the use of midfrequency active sonar in the waters off the coast of Southern California. In the decision, Winter
v. NRDC, the High Court ruled that the Navy‘s need to conduct military training using active
sonar outweighed the interests of environmentalists, who had contended that sonar results in
devastating effects on marine mammals. This paper examines the public and legal discourse
related to the case, arguing that the Navy invoked an ideograph of <military readiness> that
valorized military technology and expertise at the expense of the natural environment. The
paper then examines the implications of the case and the use of <military readiness> in public
culture.

For years, the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) and other
environmental litigants have challenged the
United States Navy over its use of sonar in
military exercises. In key legal victories at
the
district
and
appellate
levels,
environmentalists had established ―to a near
certainty‖ that the use of sonar in military
training exercises ―will cause irreparable
harm to the environment‖ (Cooper, 2007, at
33). However, when the case reached the
Supreme Court in 2008, the High Court
reversed these findings and lifted the ban
on sonar. According to the opinion of Chief
Justice Roberts in the case, Winter v.
NRDC, ―Of course, military interests do not
always trump other considerations, and we
have not held that they do. In this case,
however, the proper determination of where
the public interest lies does not strike us as
a close question‖ (2008, at 35).
By virtue of its standing as an
environmental case heard by the Supreme
Court, the ruling warrants the scrutiny of
environmental communication scholars.
Moreover, the decision in the case has
grave implications for the well being of
cetaceans and the roles of public
participation in environmental decisionmaking. Given that the Court firmly sided
with the military in this instance, the case
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raises questions about whether appeals to
the ideograph of <military readiness> will
trump <environmental protection> when
military officials assert the two come in
conflict. For while the need for <military
readiness> seems self-evident, rhetorically
it is a highly contested term that resonates
culturally
with
public
memories
of
vulnerability and surprise.
Of course, armed with a different
perspective than the one <military
readiness> allows, one might challenge the
assertion by Roberts of where the public
interest lies. In this essay, I argue that
official military, legal, and political discourse
on the controversy over military sonar and
marine mammals have utilized the dominant
ideograph of <military readiness> to exploit
public anxiety and vulnerability over
―surprise‖ attacks. In doing so, <military
readiness> has entrenched a technological
psychosis and valorized the ethos of military
decision makers through a locus of quantity.
While focusing on <military readiness> in
this context as the ―necessary motivations
or justifications for action performed in the
name of the public‖ (Condit and Lucaites,
1993, p. xiii), I examine a wide range of
rhetorical resources that are implicated in
the production and perpetuation of these
ideographic boundaries, including legal
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decisions, briefs submitted to the Supreme
Court, oral arguments before the Supreme
Court, congressional hearings, statements
by military officials, and naval publications.
I combine McGee‘s ideographic approach
with Burke‘s dramatism and Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca‘s notion of loci communes
to reveal how the full range of rhetorical
resources complemented the Navy‘s use of
<military readiness> in this controversy.
First, I examine the environmental
dispute at issue in the Winter v. NRDC
case. Next, I describe the complicated
procedural and legal history of the case.
Then I present a diachronic analysis of the
<military readiness> ideograph, followed by
a close textual reading of the legal decisions
and briefs of the case, as well as public
statements and justifications made by the
Navy in this dispute. Finally, I discuss the
broader rhetorical implications of the case.
Whales and Sonar: Environmental
Impacts and Legal Challenges
Passive sonar involves listening for
the sounds created by others, while active
sonar involves the transmission of various
sounds and the reading of its echoes as a
way of determining the presence of objects.
The most common type of sonar in use is
mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar, with
most systems operating between 3-10
kiloHertz (KHz). MFA sonar is currently
installed on nearly 200 American vessels
(Jasney, 2005, p. iv). The military is also
developing low-frequency active (LFA)
sonar, which can detect vessels at greater
distances. The Navy insists that both types
of sonar are necessary to detect the new
generation of diesel-electric submarines,
which can operate without making noise
and are virtually undetectable using passive
sonar systems.
However, active sonar systems also
transmit sound at frequencies perceptible to
marine mammals and can ―physically
damage the hearing in cetaceans or cause
them to modify their behavior in ways that
are detrimental to their well-being‖ (Buck
and Calvert, 2008, p. 2).
MFA sonar
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―generates piercing underwater sound at
extreme
pressure
levels,‖
causing
―devastating‖ effects to mammals in close
proximity to the sonar source (Brief for the
Respondents, 2008, p. 3). Sound waves
have the potential to vibrate inside the head
of a marine mammal, causing massive
internal injuries. According to the Navy, an
analysis of whales stranded in the Bahamas
in 2000 showed three with signs of bleeding
in their inner ears and one whale with signs
of bleeding around the brain. It ―basically
rips them apart,‖ remarked Cetacean
Society International president Bill Rossiter,
describing the effects of resonance on
marine mammals (Dooley n.d.). In addition
to these effects, scientists have discovered
emboli in the lungs and lesions in the liver
and kidneys of stranded whales, all
symptoms
of
a
severe
case
of
decompression sickness—‗the bends‖—
which occurs when animals try to surface
too quickly (Reynolds, 2008, p. 762). When
exposed to sonar, marine mammals can
experience a wide range of severe physical
traumas
causing
―nervous
and
cardiovascular
system
dysfunction,
respiratory distress, disorientation, and
death‖ (Brief for the Respondents, 2008, p.
4).
Mass strandings of marine mammals
have coincided with military use of active
sonar systems in a number of locations. In
1996, twelve Cuvier‘s beaked whales were
stranded in Greece. In 2000, 17 marine
mammals were stranded in the Bahamas
shortly after the Navy began exercises
using MFA sonar. A subsequent study by
the Navy and the National Marine Fisheries
Service concluded that the sonar exercises
contributed to the strandings (Joint Interim
Report 2001). Other strandings have been
documented in the Canary Islands, the
Virgin Islands, Washington State, Hawaii,
and North Carolina, all coinciding with
military activities (Reynolds 2008).
There is also evidence that once
exposed to sonar, marine mammals will
alter their migratory habits. After Naval
sonar exercises in the Bahamas in 2000, a
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group of Cuvier‘s beaked whales that
biologists had recorded for years had
virtually disappeared, leading scientists to
surmise that the mammals died or ―were
driven to permanently abandon their habitat‖
(Jasney, 2005, p. 11). Other effects of MFA
sonar on marine mammals include adverse
effects on the animals‘ ability to
communicate, breed, and avoid predators.
Environmentalists believe that the ―ripple
effects‖ of these impacts could seriously
damage marine ecosystems (Brief for the
Ecological Society 2008).
Several studies have confirmed the
consequences of sonar on marine
mammals.
In its 2004 Report of the
Scientific Committee, the International
Whaling Commission concluded that the
association between sonar and beaked
whale deaths ―is very convincing and
appears overwhelming‖ (quoted in Jasney,
2005, pp. 6-7). In addition, the Navy‘s own
Office of Naval Research has concluded
that the evidence linking whale beaching to
sonar is ―completely convincing and there is
serious issue of how best to avoid/minimize
future beaching events‖ (quoted in Brief of
California Coastal Commission, 2008, p. 30)
Although the U.S. military has
resisted efforts to stem the use of active
sonar systems, the international community
has called for the curtailment of sonar. In
October 2004, the European Parliament
adopted a resolution calling on its members
to stop using high-intensity active sonar
systems (Dycus, 2005, p. 32). The United
Nations also expressed concern about the
effects of ocean noise on marine mammals.
At a U.N. meeting in 2005, a coalition of
more than 120 environmental organizations
urged nations to take actions to protect
marine mammals from unregulated ocean
noise (Buck and Calvert, 2008, p. 12).
In the United States, the statutory
mechanism that protects cetaceans is the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972,
which prohibits anyone from ―taking‖3 a

marine mammal. However, the Secretary of
Defense may ―exempt any action or
category of actions‖ from the MMPA if they
are ―necessary for national defense‖
(Roberts, 2008, at 15). Tensions between
the Navy and environmentalists over the
use of sonar had emerged in previous
disputes, resulting in a 2006 settlement that
allowed training exercises to continue, so
long as the Navy implemented ―mitigation
measures‖ designed to minimize the effects
of MFA sonar on marine mammals. These
measures included lookouts on deck to
search for whales prior to the start of
training exercises, and reduced decibel
levels when sailors spotted whales or when
inclement weather prevented the sighting of
whales (Mongeon, 2008, p. 277).
Despite the settlement agreement, in
early 2007 the Navy planned fourteen largescale training exercises off the coast of
Southern California (known as the ―SOCAL
exercises‖) in the two-year period from
February 2007 to January 2009.
The
waters off the coast of Southern California
―are among the richest and most biologically
diverse in the world,‖ containing at least 37
species of marine mammals, including nine
of those species listed as threatened or
endangered under the Endangered Species
Act and others whose entire known range is
along this coastline (Brief for the
Respondents, 2008, p. 3). Nevertheless, in
January 2007, the Navy was granted an
exemption from the MMPA for these training
exercises, and in February 2007, the Navy
completed an Environmental Assessment
(EA) of the planned SOCAL exercises,
which predicted approximately 170,000
―takes‖
of
marine
mammals,
an
―extraordinary number relative to the size of
cetacean
populations
off
Southern
California‖ (Brief for Respondents, 2008, p.
5).
Despite the findings of its own
assessment, the Navy reasoned that the
environmental impact of the SOCAL
exercises would be minimal, and declined to

3

hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal.” 16 U.S.C.
1362(13).

As defined by federal law, a “take” means “to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass,
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prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). In addition, the Navy did not commit
to using any of the mitigation measures it
had agreed to in the earlier settlement
(Mongeon, 2008, p. 278).
In response to the Navy‘s decision,
NRDC and five other environmental
plaintiffs4 filed suit against the Navy on
March 22, 2007, seeking injunctive relief for
violations of the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA), the Coastal Zone
Management
Act
(CZMA),
the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). On
June 22, 2007, NRDC filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction against the Navy,
arguing that either the military had to stop
using MFA sonar in the SOCAL waters, or
put in place the mitigation measures
designed to protect marine mammals. On
August 6, 2007, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California
granted a preliminary injunction against the
Navy‘s use of sonar5. In granting NRDC‘s
motion for a preliminary injunction, the
district court found, among other things, that
NRDC had demonstrated probable success
on the merits of its claim that the Navy
violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS
prior to the exercises. The Navy quickly
filed an emergency motion to stay the
injunction, which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted on
August 31, 2007, pending an expedited
appeal.6 Stating that the ―safety of the
whales must be weighed, and so must the
safety of our warriors. And of the country,‖
the appellate court criticized the district
court for not weighing more explicitly the
national security interests of the public, and
it also suggested that the preliminary
injunction could have been more narrowly

4

The other plaintiffs in the case were the Fund for Animal
Welfare, the Cetacean Society International, the League for
Coastal Protection, the Ocean Futures Society, and JeanMichel Cousteau. For simplicity, I refer to the case by the
lead plaintiff, the NRDC.
5
NRDC v. Winter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57909, at 33.
6
NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859.
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tailored to allow for the resumption of
military exercises with mitigation measures.7
On November 13, 2007, the
appellate court vacated the stay and
remanded the case back to the district court
so that it could have an opportunity to
modify the injunction to include appropriate
mitigation measures.8
Members of the
District Court then read reply briefs
submitted by the parties after the remand
order, and even toured the USS Milius at
the naval base in San Diego to enhance
their understanding of the Navy‘s sonar
training procedures.
Hearing the case
again on January 3, 2008, district court
Judge Florence-Marie Cooper ordered the
Navy to adopt stricter safeguards to protect
marine mammals.
These mitigation
measures included a twelve nautical mile
exclusion zone from the California coastline,
a shutdown of MFA sonar when a marine
mammal ventured within 2200 yards of the
source of the emission, pre-exercise
monitoring for marine mammals for 60
minutes prior to using MFA sonar as well as
monitoring during the exercises, a power
down when surface ducting conditions
(occurring when temperature differences in
adjacent layers of water causes sound to
travel at greater distances) are detected, the
prohibition of sonar use in the Catalina
Basin, and other measures.9 The Navy
then filed an emergency motion to stay the
preliminary injunction, which the district
court denied on January 14, 2008.10
Seeking to circumvent the court‘s
order, the Navy made its case before the
executive Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), presenting it with a ―one-sided
portion of the district court record,
containing only the Navy‘s evidence and
arguments‖ and without the presence of
NRDC attorneys (Brief for the Respondents,
2008, p. 11). Citing the Navy‘s assertion of
―emergency circumstances,‖ the CEQ
approved ―alternative arrangements‖ on
7

NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, at 864.
NRDC v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885.
9
NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110.
10
NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216.
8
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January 15, 2008, permitting the Navy to
continue its exercises while it completed its
EIS. On the same day, President George
W. Bush signed an executive order that
exempted the Navy from the provisions of
the CZMA regulating its use of MFA sonar
in the SOCAL exercises. In light of those
developments,
the
appellate
court
remanded the case again to the district
court on January 16, 2008, to determine
what effect the executive actions had on the
original preliminary injunction. On February
4, 2008, the district court left the injunction
in place, noting that CEQ‘s approval of
―alternative arrangements‖ was invalid
because the Navy‘s ―emergency‖ was a
―creature of its own making,‖ given that the
military had planned the routine exercises
well in advance and should have produced
―adequate environmental documentation in
a timely fashion, via the traditional EIS
process or otherwise.‖11 The Navy filed a
notice of appeal two days later, this time
taking issue with just two of the six
mitigation measures imposed by the district
court—the 2200-yard shutdown and the
power-down
during
surface
ducting
conditions.
On February 27, 2008, the appellate
court affirmed the district court‘s decision
and left the injunction in place, arguing that
it was narrowly-tailored to balance the
public interests in the natural environment
and a well-trained Navy. Still, ―acting out of
an abundance of caution,‖ the Ninth Circuit
court modified the injunction so that the
Navy need only reduce, not suspend, its
use of sonar in the 2200-yard zone if marine
mammals are detected at a ―critical point in
the exercise,‖ and power-down during
surface-ducting conditions only when
observers detect a marine mammal within a
specified distance of the source of the
sonar.12
Unsatisfied with this legal result, the
Navy appealed the case, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on June 23, 2008,
11
12

NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, at 30.
NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658.
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and heard oral arguments on October 8,
2008. On November 12, 2008, the high
court announced a ruling in the case,
coming down ―solidly on the side of national
security‖ by reversing the judgment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and lifting the judicial restrictions on the use
of MFA sonar in submarine training
exercises off the coast of Southern
California (Liptak, 2008, p. A24).13
<National Security> and <Military
Readiness> as Ideographs
Ideographs, writes Michael Calvin
McGee, are ―one-term sums of an
orientation‖ that ―exist in real discourse,
functioning clearly and evidently as agents
of political consciousness‖ (1980, p. 7).
They are ―historically and culturally
grounded commonplace rhetorical terms
that sum up and invoke identification with
key social commitments‖ (Cloud, 2004, p.
288). An analysis of ideographs involves an
account of the ways that rhetors ―dip into,
add to, and reshape the shared cultural
stock‖ generated by these widely used and
near-universal terms and phrases (Cloud,
1998, p. 389).
McGee suggests that critics analyze
both the diachronic and synchronic aspects
of ideographs (McGee 1980).
The
diachronic structure of an ideograph
―represents the full range and history of its
usages for a particular rhetorical culture‖
(Condit and Lucaites, 1993, p. xiii). It calls
for an identification of those situations
where the ideograph is invoked and a
description of the salient features of its use
in those circumstances.
A synchronic
analysis of ideographs examines how
rhetors make use of them presently,
especially when they complete with
opposing ideographs, in a situation where
the hallowed term constantly reorganizes
itself
―to
accommodate
specific
circumstances
while
maintaining
its
fundamental
consonance
and
unity‖
(McGee, 1980, p. 14). Rhetors engage in
13

Winter v. NRDC, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249.
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struggles to define the boundaries of any
given ideograph, but they are often
constrained by the dominant understanding
of the ideograph in a public culture. Celeste
Michelle Condit argues that a rhetorical
critic develops an understanding of
persuasive discourse by examining the
interaction and development of ideographs
with narratives and characterizations (1987,
pp. 3-4). The stories that a culture tells and
the depictions it provides of particular
agents, acts, scenes, purposes, and
agencies helps to generate a dominant
world view around a given set of
ideographs.
A full accounting of the diachronic
origin of <military readiness> is beyond the
scope of this essay. However, appeals to
<military readiness> have been invoked at
strategic times throughout American history.
It is widely perceived that the ―ability to be
ready to fight or conduct military operations
successfully‖ is one of the most important
purposes of the military (Laird, 1980, p. 1).
George Washington, in his first Annual
Address to Congress, declared, ―To be
prepared for war is one of the most effectual
means of preserving peace.‖ With respect
to maritime readiness in particular,
Theodore Roosevelt observed, ―the only
way in which a navy can ever be made
efficient is by practice at sea, under all the
conditions which would have to be met if
war existed‖ (Brief for the Petitioners, 2008,
p. 48). And while Chief Justice Roberts
cited both of these statements in his opinion
in Winter, McGee (1980) urges critics to
look for touchstones that serve as cultural
precedents for ideographs. In particular,
iconic events are those seminal moments
―which seem to acquire a mythic status
within the culture‖ (Leavy, 2007, p. 3) and
generate opportunities for ideographic
construction and refinement. In the context
of American <military readiness>, one
moment stands out as iconic: the December
7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor.14 While
14

An extended version of this essay includes a diachronic
analysis of the uses of <military readiness> after the
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implied throughout much of the discourse in
Winter over enemy use of diesel-electric
submarines,
Roberts
made
explicit
reference to the Pearl Harbor analogy in
oral arguments before the Court on October
8, 2008. At ―no point,‖ complained the Chief
Justice, ―did the district judge undertake a
balancing of the equities, putting on the one
side the potential for harm to marine
mammals…and putting on the other side
the potential that a North Korean diesel
electric submarine will get within range of
Pearl Harbor undetected. Now, I think that‘s
a pretty clear balance‖ (Oral Arguments,
2008, p. 48).
As Michael Slackman observes,
―There is little argument…that the Pearl
Harbor attack was a dramatic event which in
the space of a few hours plunged the United
States into the most destructive war of the
twentieth century and changed forever the
way most Americans viewed the world
around them‖ (1990, p. vii).
Although
research has confirmed that American
officials had numerous warnings that a
Japanese attack was pending (Wohlstetter
1962; Posner 2005: Wirtz 2006), Pearl
Harbor has achieved mythic status in
American culture as a moment when
America was caught by surprise. ―In the
popular view,‖ writes Richard K. Betts, ―the
Japanese attack on Hawaii was a true ‗bolt
out of the blue,‘ without warning, and a pure
example of unprovoked perfidy‖ (1982, p.
42).
One of the many cultural ―lessons‖
that some derived from the Pearl Harbor
attack was the need for constant vigilance
against the strategic vulnerability that
comes with complacency.
Although
competing narratives of the attack have
circulated for decades, the dominant public
memory of the event falls within the ―infamy
framework‖ that harkens back to rhetorical
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon, especially considering the comparisons that
public officials have made between Pearl Harbor and 9/11.
Both events resonate as examples of the lack of military
preparedness, but Pearl Harbor is more relevant to the
public justification of MFA sonar, given that it relies upon
fears of enemy utilization of advanced military technologies.
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traditions of
the American frontier
(Rosenberg 2003, pp. 12-13). According to
this tradition, diabolical forces will exploit
weak, feminized, and complacent publics,
but salvation for the Nation is available
through retributive, masculine uses of
military power.
The <military readiness> ideograph
thrives in this rhetorical context because it
offers an antidote to the perceived
vulnerability of surprise attacks.
Pearl
Harbor serves as an iconic touchstone, ―a
singular moment in modern American
history‖ when ―penetration of our borders by
a hostile force…had the effect on the
country that a burglary has on the family
home: people never felt quite as safe again‖
(Jennings and Brewster, 1998, p. 239).
Pearl Harbor is constructed in public
memory as a cautionary tale, and combined
with <military readiness> it serves as a
narrative reminding citizens to stay vigilant
against surprise attacks, to utilize superior
American technology to uncover and thwart
potential surprises, and to heed the
warnings of military officials while rejecting
policies that might impede military
preparedness (especially when they are
promoted by those who are ignorant of
strategic dangers). This rhetoric functions
to ―persuade us of war‘s necessity, but then
[we] forget that it is a rhetoric‖ (McGee,
1980, p. 6).
Analysis
Even before NRDC had initiated the
legal action that led to the Supreme Court
decision in Winter v. NRDC, the military had
rehearsed
<readiness>
in
other
environmental contexts by affixing the
rhetorical label of ―encroachment‖ on any
regulation that allegedly hindered military
preparedness.
Speaking
during
congressional hearings in 2001, Army Lt.
Gen. Larry Ellis testified, ―readiness is
critical to our ability to perform the missions
assigned to us and to do so efficiently and
with minimum casualties‖ (quoted in
Bethurem, 2002, p. 122).
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When NRDC and the other
environmental plaintiffs challenged the use
of MFA sonar in training exercises off the
coast of Southern California, the military
utilized <military readiness> in a variety of
legal and public contexts. In a statement
before the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee on April 2, 2003, Rear
Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, the deputy
commander of the Navy‘s Pacific fleet,
warned of ―new ultra quiet diesel-electric
submarines armed with deadly torpedoes
and cruise missiles‖ that could only be
detected by sailors who could ―train
realistically with the latest technology,
including next-generation passive and
active sonars‖ (pp. 244-45).
Claiming,
―military readiness requirements and
environmental protection are out of
balance,‖ Greenert urged lawmakers to
support the Navy‘s perspective.
In a
declaration
on
―The
Impact
of
Environmental Extremism on Military
Readiness,‖ the Senate Republican Policy
Committee
railed
against
―burdensome…environmental laws and
lawsuits which prevent the military from fully
achieving readiness,‖ and singled out
lawsuits that prevented the Navy from using
―sonar to track the newer, ultra-quiet
submarines operated by China, North
Korea, and Iran‖ (U.S. Senate Republican
Policy Committee, 2003, p. 1). According to
the Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter
in his 2008 Posture Statement, ―the most
critical readiness issue relates to the Navy‘s
ability to train using active sonar…The
inability to train effectively with active sonar
literally puts the lives of thousands of
Americans at risk‖ (p. 11).
Kenneth Burke (1984) has identified
the technological psychosis as the
prevailing orientation of modern society.
While Burke examined a range of
psychoses, the technological perspective
emerged as dominant: ―in and about all
these, above them, beneath them, mainly
responsible for their perplexities, is the
technological psychosis,‖ the drive ―to
control for our purposes the forces of
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technology, or machinery‖ (p. 44). Floyd D.
Anderson and Lawrence J. Prelli (2001)
explain that such an orientation typically
features a pentadic ratio of agency-purpose
or agency-scene as dominant: ―Indeed, the
central
motivation
locked
within
technological discourse is agency-purpose;
its strict instrumentalism not only transforms
acts, agents, and scenes into terms of
agency, but even purposes themselves
become meaningful only when nearly
synonymous with agency‖ (p. 80).
Subordinated in this vocabulary of motives
are perspectives that feature agent, act, or
scene.
In the Winter case, the Navy‘s
appeal of the preliminary injunction centered
on its objection to two of the mitigation
measures imposed by the district court: the
2200-yard shutdown requirement and the
power-down requirement during surface
ducting conditions. These requirements
were hardly onerous, given the Navy‘s
experience conducting exercises with
restrictions similar to the ones mandated by
the district court.
For example, the
settlement between the Navy and NRDC
that the parties reached shortly before the
Navy‘s ―Rim of the Pacific‖ exercise off the
coast of Hawaii in 2006 had similar
stipulations (Fletcher, 2008, at 35-40).
Following these exercises, the Navy issued
an ―after action report‖ that recorded a total
of 472 hours of MFA sonar use with only
eight hours of lost time due to the mitigation
measures. Furthermore, NRDC presented
evidence that the effect of widening the
safety zone to 2200 yards would have been
only one additional shutdown or power
down for each exercise (Oral Arguments,
2008, p. 37), and also pointed out that the
Navy certified its sonar technicians even
when they had not practiced under surface
ducting environments, given the infrequency
of those conditions.
Still, the Navy objected to the
mitigation measures on the grounds that
they would inhibit readiness. In its brief, the
government
claimed
the
2200-yard
shutdown requirement ―would cripple the
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Navy‘s ability to conduct realistic predeployment training and to assess a strike
group‘s
capabilities‖
(Brief
for
the
Petitioners, 2008, p. 13). The Navy also
submitted numerous declarative statements
in support of this argument. Vice Admiral
Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Third
Fleet, stated that the 2200-yard shutdown
zone would ―jeopardize the training and
readiness‖ of strike groups. Rear Admiral
Bird argued that training in surface ducting
conditions was ―critical to effective training.‖
And Admiral Roughead and Rear Admiral
Branch contended that both requirements
would create an unacceptable risk and
profoundly
affect
national
security
(Statements quoted in Fletcher, 2008, at
50).
<Military readiness> functioned to
highlight the importance of agency (MFA
sonar) in fulfillment of the larger purpose of
national security. The discourse worked to
draw attention to the need for training and
proficiency in a complex technology to
counter the technological advancements
(diesel-electric submarines) of adversaries.
When drawing upon the diachronic
meanings of <readiness> generated by the
Pearl Harbor narrative, one perceives the
enemy as being capable and willing to use
technological advances to exploit American
vulnerabilities. Regulations that limit the
use of MFA sonar—such as the 2200-yard
shutdown zone and the surface ducting
requirements—became impediments to the
successful mastery of agency in the service
of the dominant ideograph.
Thus,
responding to litigants who claimed that
surface ducting conditions were rare,
Roberts asserted in Winters that the
―reasoning is backwards‖ and that, if
anything, ―it is especially important for the
Navy to be able to train under these
conditions when they occur‖ (2008, at 4142).
Terminologies featuring agents
(whales), scene (the environment) and act
(the injunction) became subordinated to
agency (sonar) and purpose (readiness).
In The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation, Chaim Perelman and Lucie
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Olbrechts-Tyteca identify loci communes as
those categories (―common places‖) of a
general nature that advocates use to
advance argumentative claims (1969, pp.
83-85).
Environmental advocates have
frequently invoked a locus of quality,
particularly appeals to the irreparable, to
argue on behalf of the uniqueness,
precariousness, and timeliness of the
natural environment (Cox 1982).
But
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, ―each
locus can be confronted by one that is
contrary to it‖ (85). The NRDC and its allies
have used appeals to the irreparable to
highlight the uniqueness of the species of
marine mammals near the California
coastline, the sensitivity of these animals to
MFA sonar, and the urgent need to forestall
the Navy‘s use of sonar in these waters.
The Navy and its allies have responded with
an ideograph of <military readiness> that
shifts emphasis to a locus of quantity,
imposing difficult threshold requirements on
environmental litigants while valorizing
deference to military authorities.
To obtain a preliminary injunction,
litigants must demonstrate a combination of
probable success on the merits of its claim,
the possibility of irreparable harm, and they
must show that the balance of hardships
tips in their favor. The lower courts found
that
NRDC
had
satisfied
these
requirements. However, in its brief, the
government argued that a preliminary
injunction was ―an extraordinary and drastic
remedy,‖ and suggested the lower courts
erred in holding that litigants need only
show a ―mere possibility‖ of irreparable
harm to justify granting an injunction, as
opposed to the more stringent standard of a
―likelihood‖ of irreparable injury. In its ruling
in Winter, the Supreme Court agreed the
―possibility‖ standard was too lenient, and
instead affirmed the need for plaintiffs to
demonstrate irreparable injury was likely in
the absence of an injunction.
Aside from establishing a more
challenging
threshold
of
proof
for
environmental litigants, the shift from
possibility to likelihood facilitated a rhetorical
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transition from a locus of quality to a locus
of quantity, ―which affirm that one thing is
better than another for quantitative reasons‖
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.
85). This was apparent in the Navy‘s oftrepeated claim that it had trained in SOCAL
waters for 40 years without any evidence of
marine
mammal
fatalities.
In
oral
arguments,
Solicitor
General
Garre
stressed, ―the Navy has been using MFA
sonar in the Southern California Operating
Area for more than 40 years and no one can
point to any harm to marine mammals‖ (Oral
Arguments, 2008, p. 23). The apparent
persuasiveness of this claim was confirmed
by the frequency by which it appears in
Roberts‘s majority decision—five times.
―The Navy emphasizes that it has used
MFA sonar during training exercises in
SOCAL for 40 years,‖ wrote Roberts in one
of these examples, ―without a single
documented sonar-related injury to any
marine mammal.‖ (2008, at 14)
This rhetorical maneuver is an
example of the argumentum ad ignorantiam
fallacy, or the ―appeal to ignorance,‖ which
uses an opponent‘s inability to disprove a
conclusion as proof of the conclusion‘s
correctness (Engel, 1994, p. 227).
It
challenges environmentalists to produce
bodies as proof of irreparable harm;
otherwise, no harm is presumed to exist.
There are obvious problems to this
reasoning.
Since the injuries occur to
marine mammals while they are in the
water, many whales ―are dying in
substantially larger numbers‖ than scientists
realize, given that most of the dead animals
do not strand on shore where people can
count them (Jasney, 2005, p. v). Beaked
whales, in particular, are sensitive to sonar
but difficult to detect. A 2007 study by the
National Marine Fisheries Service revealed,
―in 90% of beaked whale stocks a decline in
population of 50% over a 15-year period
would go undetected as a decline at all‖
(Fletcher, 2008, at 31). Non-fatal injuries
would be even harder to detect. It is also
unclear from the record whether the Navy
has been using MFA sonar over the past 40
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years at the same power level, frequency,
and duration as it does in the current
exercises. In addition, in its ―after action
reports,‖ the Navy documented a number of
marine mammal deaths in SOCAL waters
following exercises using MFA sonar, but
the reports did not disclose whether
necropsies were performed on the
carcasses to determine the cause of the
deaths or whether they were linked to sonar
use (Fletcher, 2008, at 28-29).
<Military readiness> accentuates the
locus of quantity by celebrating the
expertise of military officials. Writing about
a similar ideograph of <necessity>, Marouf
Hasian
Jr.
argues,
―necessitous
circumstances are treated as a priori facts
that inform the decisions made by elites
who have the special training in the
handling of these affairs. This is one of the
reasons why we hear so much about civilian
‗deference‘ during times of war‖ (2005, p.
11).15 In the legal and public rhetoric of
<military readiness>, especially measured
quantitatively and constrained by a
technological
psychosis
emphasizing
agency, deference is granted to military
experts to assess both threats and
capabilities. During oral arguments, for
example, several justices questioned the
ability of a district court judge to render an
informed judgment on military strategy.
―Isn‘t there something incredibly odd about
a single district judge making a
determination on that defense question that
is contrary to the determination that the
Navy has made?‖ asked Justice Alito in a
question to NRDC attorney Kendall (Oral
Arguments, 2008, p. 30). When Kendall
replied that the district judge made a factual
determination in the case, Alito pressed a
similar question later in the oral arguments:
―Is Judge Cooper an expert
on
antisubmarine warfare?‖ he asked (Oral
Arguments, 2008, p. 49). Even Justice
15

While similar, the ideographs of military <necessity> and
<readiness> are distinct in many ways, since <readiness>
places emphasis on future action to prevent perceived
vulnerabilities, especially with respect to the marshaling of
military technology to reduce strategic uncertainties.
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Breyer conceded during oral arguments,
―Look, I don‘t know anything about this. I‘m
not a naval officer…[and]… I know that
district judge doesn‘t know about it, either‖
(Oral Arguments, 2008, p. 35).
This
deference to military authority was reflected
in the majority opinion in Winters, as well.
Wrote Roberts: ―We accept these officers‘
assertions that the use of MFA sonar under
realistic conditions during training exercises
is of the utmost importance to the Navy and
the Nation‖ (2008, 34)
Writing about the rhetoric of
nukespeak, Edward Schiappa (1989)
argues that military experts use strategies of
domestication and bureaucratization to
make the discourse about nuclear weapons
paradoxically familiar and inaccessible to
public audiences. In a similar way, <military
readiness>
encourages
simplification
through a narrative of surprise and
vigilance, combined with deference to
authorities perceived to be capable of
understanding strategic military doctrine.
The fact that members of the district court
visited a naval ship relegated their
experiences to those of tourists and
reinforced a presumed dependence on
military experts to decipher and explain the
complexities of military technology. Alito‘s
question about Judge Cooper‘s knowledge
of ASW further diminished her stature as a
credible authority, even though she carefully
crafted mitigation measures based on her
extensive knowledge of the facts in the
case. <Military readiness> functioned to
juxtapose a masculine ethos of military
experience with a feminized, sentimental
pathos for marine mammals.
Conclusion
In their attempts to dismiss evidence
linking MFA sonar to the deaths and injuries
of marine mammals, the Navy and its
proponents have resorted to absurd
arguments, such as the claim that marine
mammals are not affected by sonar
because they spend most of their time out
of the water, or that whales ―just swim in a
different direction‖ when they hear the noise
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produced by sonar (Oral Arguments, 2008,
pp. 8-9).
Perhaps realizing that the
scientific case linking military sonar with
cetacean mortalities and injuries has
―progressed well beyond the point of finding
a smoking gun‖ (Parsons et. al., 2008, p.
1255), the Navy has relied increasingly on
rhetorics emphasizing <military readiness>
to show that ―national security can trump
marine mammal protection‖ (Brief for the
Petitioners, 2008, p. 35). In this essay, I
have demonstrated that this ideograph
constitutes public audiences as victims
vulnerable to surprise attack, whose best
option relies on deference to military
authorities to protect them with technology
that should be used without constraints.
There
are
several
―potential
consequences of public adherence to a
particular vocabulary of motives‖ (Cloud,
1998, p. 389). From a legal standpoint,
Winter v. NRDC raises several troubling
prospects. First, military officials are certain
to invoke <military readiness> with renewed
vigor when confronted with situations that
―encroach‖ on military training, and there
are numerous instances where they believe
this is the case (Dycus 1996; Burke 2008;
Babcock 2007; Yap 2004). Second, as
mentioned earlier, environmental advocates
will need to establish a ―likelihood‖ of
irreparable harm in future cases to warrant
an injunction against damaging practices.
Thus, even though the military faced no
threshold of proof when it asserted its
harms in Winter (there was no discussion of
the likelihood of an attack by diesel-electric
submarines, and such harms were assumed
plausible based only on the declarative
statements
of
military
authorities),
advocates will be faced with a high
threshold in future cases where they seek
injunctive relief against environmental
harms. Third, the case has potentially
significant
implications
for
public
participation in environmental decisions.
When it enacted NEPA in 1969, Congress
created a process that, for the first time,
involved ―the public in environmental
decision making in a comprehensive
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manner‖ (Cox, 2006, p. 93). NEPA requires
agencies to prepare an EIS when significant
environmental impacts result from proposed
actions.
But the Navy avoided the
requirement for public comment by only
completing an environmental assessment
(EA) of its SOCAL exercises.16 An EIS
wasn‘t scheduled for completion until the
conclusion of those exercises. While some
suggested the scope of Winter is limited
(Eubanks 2009), if a similar pattern is
followed in future cases, the public will
either be left out of deliberations or allowed
to participate only after the environmental
harms have occurred.
Rhetorically, advocates working
within the existing legal framework are
constrained by <military readiness> and
often do not challenge it directly. Although
he noted that ―the Navy cannot be the judge
of its own cause‖ and that ―deference does
have its limits,‖ NRDC attorney Kendall
admitted that Naval training was ―of the
highest importance‖ (Oral Arguments, 2008,
p. 50).
Constrained by the coercive
dimensions of ideographic adherence,
advocates working in the court system
might rely heavily on the precautionary
principle, with preference given to the
probable (harm to whales) over the
improbable (reduced readiness as a result
of mitigation measures). However, while
this balancing of risk was persuasive to the
lower courts, the Supreme Court decision in
Winter makes this option difficult. This is
perhaps the reason why NRDC settled
recently a separate lawsuit against the Navy
over sonar, agreeing to a proposal requiring
the Navy to spend $14.75 million over three
years on marine mammal research, but
does not include any of the additional
measures to protect animals when the
16

An EIS has far more stringent requirements than an EA.
An EIS must ―[r]igourously explore and objectively evaluate
all reasonable alternatives‖ to the agency‘s action (Amici
Curiae Brief for Defenders, 2008, pp. 36-37), which in this
case would have meant examining and evaluating the
effects of implementing mitigation measures. In addition, the
EIS allows for an ―early and open process‖ for public
comment on the proposed action (Amici Curiae Brief for
Defenders, 2008, p. 36).
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military uses sonar (―Navy Settles,‖ 2008, p.
A13).
In countering a scientific, military,
and technological orientation, Kenneth
Burke (1984) urges critics to adopt a
dialectical
process
that
seeks
counterstatements
to
prevailing
perspectives. In a similar move, Kevin
Michael DeLuca (1999) draws upon the
work of Laclau and Mouffe to suggest
―antagonism chains‖ that might ―challenge
and transform the hegemonic discourse of
modern society (p. 45). Such options might
not be available in legal venues constrained
by the decorum of precedent, but they
would be available to advocates in the
larger public sphere who might rearticulate
<military readiness> in ways that challenged
the presumed linkage between security,
technology, and the domination of nature.
Already, once dominant appeals to national
security are encountering pressure points,
as issues concerning detainees and
warrantless wiretapping reveal the excesses
of ideographic commitments.
In a revealing moment during the
oral arguments before the Supreme Court
on October 8, 2008, Justice Breyer stated,
―To a layperson, when I think of the armed
forces preparing an environmental impact
statement, I think, the whole point of the
armed forces is to hurt the environment‖
(Oral Arguments, 2008, p. 44).
The
transcript notes there was laughter in the
courtroom, indicating perhaps that the
comment was intended as a joke to make a
larger point about procedural requirements
under NEPA.
But if we might allow
ourselves the pleasure to look back at this
comment from the perspective of citizens
liberated from <military readiness>, might
we say that Justice Breyer was on to
something?
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